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The suite of reports that make up the Long Term Mitigation Scenario study includes the following: 
 
A  Long Term Mitigation Scenarios for South Africa  
B Technical Summary 
C Technical Report 
C.1  Technical Appendix 
D  Process Report 
 
The study was supported by the following inputs: 
LTMS Input Report 1: Energy emissions 
LTMS Input Report 2: Non-energy emissions: Agriculture, Forestry and Waste 
LTMS Input Report 3: Non-energy emissions: Industrial Processes 
LTMS Input Report 4: Economy-wide modelling 








The LTMS: motivation, process and results 
 
In March 2006, the South African Cabinet commissioned a process to examine the potential for 
mitigation1 of our country’s greenhouse gas emissions. The process was to be informed by the best 
available information. The aim was to produce Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) that 
would provide a sound scientific analysis from which Cabinet could draw up a long-term climate 
policy. Such a policy would give South African negotiators under the United Nations Framework 
Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) clear and mandated positions for their negotiations. It 
would also ensure that South African stakeholders understood and committed to a range of 
realistic strategies for future climate action.   
 
The first phase of this study has now been 
completed. A Scenario Building Team, 
comprised of strategic thinkers from government, 
business and civil society2 working with four 
research teams, has produced this Scenario 
Document, backed up by a Technical Summary, 
which is in turn underpinned by detailed 
technical research. The document is to be 
presented to leaders in each sector for further discussion and refinement. A final version will be 


















This document attempts to answer two fundamental questions:  
Why should South Africa be concerned with the mitigation of greenhouse gases?  
and 
What options for mitigation are available, how much can each option reduce emissions, and at 
what cost?  
 
Starting from a base year of 2003 and continuing to a 2050 horizon, the Scenario Building Team 
explores two possible scenarios, assessing them against the full range of possible international 
climate change contexts. As will be seen, the assessment suggests that only one of these scenarios 
is actually robust. The Scenario Building Team then proceeds to explore, within the robust 
scenario, four strategic options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
                                            
1 Mitigation is the reduction of greenhouse gases, the most important of which is carbon dioxide (CO2). 
2 A full list of members of the Scenario Building Team is included in the Process Report. 
LONG TERM MITIGATION SCENARIOS 
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The challenge of Climate Change 
 
 The scientific evidence for a rise in global temperature over the past century is 
unequivocal. 
 Climate change is almost certainly3 driven by increased greenhouse gas concentrations 
caused by human activities. 
 Climate change is already having predominantly negative impacts on people and 
ecosystems. Further temperature rises will have increasingly detrimental effects. 
 To keep temperature increase within a range between 2.0 and 2.4ºC, global emissions have 
to peak by 2015 and then decline.4 
 The economic case for action is compelling. The costs of emission reduction are high, but 
the costs of inaction will be far higher, because climate impacts require large-scale 
adaptation. 
 This is not just an environmental issue. It goes to the very heart of the world’s future 
economic viability, including achieving and sustaining the Millennium Development 
Goals. 
 
For South Africa, the implications are important: 
 South Africans, and particularly our poor communities, are especially vulnerable to many 
of the projected future climate impacts.
5
 These impacts will most likely be catastrophic if 
climate change is not checked and drastically reduced. 
 It is therefore in the interests of all South Africans that global emissions decrease to a 
degree that avoids dangerous climate change. 
 South Africa is already committed to playing its part in this effort to mitigate emissions. 
The country is proactively engaging in the multilateral climate negotiations, which will 
likely agree on the future of the climate regime by 2009. 
 Developing countries are currently not constrained under the Kyoto Protocol. However in 
the upcoming international negotiations there is increasing pressure on the larger 
developing country emitters to demonstrate their plans for achieving emissions reductions. 
 It is accordingly incumbent on South Africa not only to urgently develop such a plan, but 
also to prepare the path for its implementation, at an appropriate time in the future, and to 
achieve the emissions reductions targets agreed upon. This LTMS document aims to help 
decision-makers begin this process. 
 
The economic challenges are huge because of the sheer scale of the mitigation 
solutions required.  However the alternatives to taking action on mitigation are  even more 
expensive. The Stern Review
6
 has reported that the costs of adaptation
7
 for the world should no 
mitigation occur (‘the costs of inaction’), will be in the order of 5 to 20 times the cost of the 
mitigation actions required. Hence if the world, including South Africa, does not mitigate, it will 
be overtaken by climate impacts and their much larger damage costs.  
                                            
3 According to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, “most of the observed increase in globally averaged 
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations”. ‘Very likely’ means that the assessed likelihood, using expert judgement, is greater than 90%. 
4  See the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group III, Summary for Policymakers, Table SPM.5.  
5 An updated study on climate change impacts and adaptation in South Africa is reported separately. 
 
6 The Stern Review (2006) on the economics of climate change (see www.hm-treasury.gov.uk, go to Independent 
Reviews, and Stern Review).  










Three areas need to be brought together into a coherent vision to formulate and 
implement a plan of action that is economically risk-averse and internationally aligned 
to the world effort on climate change. These are: 
• Technology: Wider deployment of existing climate-friendly technology is 
necessary, together with commercialisation of emerging technologies and 
spending at scale on research and development of new technology. 
• Investment: The sources, mechanisms, and extent of investment in a low-carbon 
society need to be found and actively pursued. 
• Policy: The country will need clear guidance through policy frameworks that 




South Africa in the context of climate change  
 
The focus of this document is mitigation: if South Africa takes the decision to mitigate, then this 
document addresses how to determine the options, the emissions reductions achieved by these 
options, and the attendant costs of each option.
8
 How, then, is South Africa to grow and develop in 
order to reduce poverty, while at the same time retooling its economy in order to reduce its 




In 2004, the world produced about 49 000 Mt CO2-equiv
9, mainly from energy generation and 
deforestation. In comparison, South Africa produced about 440 Mt, or about 1% of the global 
figure.  
 
South Africa’s emissions are large relative to its population and economy. Our coal-based energy 
economy has enjoyed relatively low energy prices historically, which have favoured energy-
intensive industries.  




 Annual GHG emissions,  
2000  
Cumulative CO2  emissions,  
1950-2000 
 Mt CO2-equiv % Mt CO2     % 
 Six gases,  
energy & LULUCF 
As share of 
global total 
CO2 only,  
energy & LULUCF 
As share of 
global total 
South Africa 415 1.0% 10,250 0.9% 
Brazil 2,213 5.4% 68,389 6.1% 
China 4,920 11.9% 110,675 9.9% 
India 1,814 4.4% 17,581 1.6% 
OECD 15,423 37.4% 467,564 42.0% 
World 41,240 100.0% 1,113,122 100.0% 
 
 
As the left hand figure below shows, South Africa’s emissions intensity (i.e. emissions per GDP) 
is high compared to most developed (OECD) countries and developing countries. Our emissions 
per capita are higher than China and India, which are also coal-based energy economies, and 






                                            
8 Our state of knowledge currently does not enable us to model the comparative “costs of inaction” in South Africa.  
9 Greenhouse gas emissions are measured by Megatons (Mt) of CO2-equivalent. Emissions from the other greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) are converted to CO2-equivalents by Global Warming Potentials – 21 tons of CO2 equivalent to 1 ton of 
methane, 310 per ton of nitrous oxide. Units of million tons (Megatons, Mt) are preferred, although inventories tend to 
report in Gigagrams (Gg). 1 Mt = 1000 Gg. 
10 Note on table: Gases for annual emissions include CO2 (energy), CO2  (land use change), CH4, N20, PFCs, HFCs, 
SF6.  
















Note on graphs  : ‘Per capita’ means annual emissions of a country or region divided by its 
population. ‘Emissions intensity’ divides emissions by economic output ($ of GDP), with 
GDP measured in international dollars on a power purchasing parity basis. 
 
South Africa is therefore in a difficult position in relation to some proposed climate regimes. 
Some countries argue – on the basis of equity – for allocation of emission allowances on a per 
capita basis. South Africa already exceeds the global average. Other proposals for developing 
countries are based on emissions intensity. Again, given our high relative emissions intensity, this 
is not likely to be a favourable approach for South Africa. The Brazilian Proposal takes a different 
approach to equity, allocating emissions based on historical responsibility for temperature change.  
 
The multilateral negotiations 
 
South Africa has ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its 
Kyoto Protocol, and plays a proactive role in the climate negotiations. Thus far, South Africa has 
been exempt from taking mandatory action to reduce our high level of relative emissions. In the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the principle of equity and 
“common but differentiated responsibility” was agreed, by which the developed nations would 
take the lead in mitigating greenhouse gases. South Africa has a loose commitment to mitigate 
under the Convention, but no legally binding, quantified target.  
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, carbon constraints, or caps, were placed on industrialised countries 
only. In the first commitment period (2008 to 2012), South Africa, along with other larger 
developing countries such as Brazil, China and India, may continue to grow without any cap on 
emissions. However, once the developed nations take the lead with more ambitious emissions 
reductions, they will expect at least some developing countries to take a fair share of our common 
(albeit still differentiated) responsibility. What happens to the climate regime beyond 2012 is 
currently the subject of negotiations, with agreement expected in 2009. It is therefore urgent for 
South Africa to translate LTMS into policy and negotiation positions. 
 
Pressing for total exemption from any mitigation effort is not an option for South Africa. This is 
because the full extent of the impacts South Africa will progressively experience over the 21st 
century will depend on how much the international community constrains their emissions. The 
more effective the agreement, the more South Africa will be protected from serious or even 



































































of others to match the challenge of the science. It will have to match the international 
community’s commitment with a commitment of its own.   
 
Hence the question is: In the negotiations ahead, what position should South Africa take? This 
choice can only be based on a full knowledge of how different mitigation options (wedges) reduce 
emissions and how much might they cost, What actions should South Africa take, and should they 
be packaged so that emissions peak fairly early – and at what level might the peak be?  When 
should emissions begin to decline, and how fast?  
 
The Scenario Building Team of the LTMS has explored these questions. The key results are 




The LTMS Scenarios and Strategies were achieved rigorously, both in the processes followed 
and the data used. A bank of data was produced by modelling, and agreed with the Scenario 
Building Team. This is presented in the LTMS Technical Report (a Summary of which is 
attached). Cost and emissions levels for a number of mitigation actions were calculated. 
Assumptions that underpin all scenarios include population growth, GDP projections, prices 
of oil and other fuels, as well as exchange rates. The data was also fed into economic models, 





 What if South Africa did not mitigate its emissions before 2050?  
The “Growth without Constraints” story  
 
What would our economy and greenhouse gas emissions look like if by 2050 (and beyond) South 
Africa were to develop without any consideration of greenhouse gas emission?  What would be 
the scenario if there were no climate impacts highly damaging to the economy, if there was no 
significant oil constraint, if we made our choices to energise our economy purely on least-cost 
grounds and without internalising external costs? This scenario is labelled the Growth without 
Constraints Scenario. All other scenarios and strategic options are assessed against it – it is our 
reference case.
12
   
 
Assumptions about economic growth that underpin this scenario were consistent with the growth 
targets of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for SA (ASGISA), ranging between 3% 
and 6% GDP growth per year. These and other assumptions were fed into the model, which 
selected the least-cost sources of energy to fuel the economy over the period 2003 to 2050.  
Current trends in land use, agriculture and waste sectors were assumed to continue. 
 
Here are the characteristics of the Growth without Constraints Scenario:  
 
• Overall emissions 
SA’s emissions in the base year 2003 stand at 440 megatons of CO2-eq. By 2050 our 
emissions have quadrupled to around 1600 Mt per year.  
 
• Demand side: Energy efficiency 
Overall fuel consumption grows more than five-fold, mainly in the industry and transport 
sectors (see the Technical Report for details). There is no incentive for (and therefore no 
uptake of) energy efficiency, despite the potential net savings over time, demonstrating the 
typical market pattern of not taking up no-cost strategies.  
 
• Supply side: Coal  
New coal-fired electricity generating plants use supercritical steam technology (23 GW, or 
7 new plants, by 2050) or integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC)13 (68 GW, or 21 
new plants, by 2050). IGCC becomes attractive as it is only slightly more expensive but 
significantly more efficient than supercritical coal technology. Since no carbon constraints 
are imposed, no electricity plants have carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
• Supply side: Nuclear 
A total of 9 new conventional nuclear plants are built, mostly between 2023 and 2040, 
adding 15 GW of new capacity. Twelve modules of PBMR (Pebble Bed Modular 
Reactors) are built for domestic use. 
 
• Supply side: Renewables 
Very few renewables enter the electricity mix in this Scenario. No electricity is generated 
from solar, thermal, or wind, with the only significant addition being 70 MW of landfill 
gas.  
 
                                            
12 The reference case was modelled in great detail. Figures quoted are arrived at through this modelling process. 
13 IGCC plants first gasify coal, before it is combusted. 
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• Liquid fuel 
Liquid fuel supply is dominated by oil and synfuel (coal-to-liquids, CTL) refineries. Five 
new oil refineries add 1.5 million barrels per day by 2050. Five additional CTL plants are 
built over the period, each with a capacity of 80 000 barrels-eq per day, i.e. each half a 
Secunda. The costs of bringing forward water supply options are a potential constraint, 
with the costs of securing a reliable supply potentially prohibitive under current economic 
conditions. In this Scenario, CTL plants are built without carbon capture and storage 
(CCS). 
 
• Human behaviour 
Patterns of human consumption of energy and goods do not change markedly in the period, 
compared to 2003 patterns. 
   
Emissions continue to be dominated by energy sources. Electricity generation accounts for 45% of 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2003, declining to 33% in 2050. The declining share of electricity is 
due to emissions growth from liquid fuels, with five new coal-to-liquid plants. Industrial process 
emissions (non-energy) increase more than four times, with the largest share in this category 
coming from synfuels. Emissions in the other non-energy sectors – notably waste, agriculture and 
forestry – increase much less rapidly than for the energy sector. The diagram that follows 
summarises the emissions and respective shares of each major sector: 
 
































































































Notes on graph: CTL is coal to liquids; IPE are industrial process emissions, not including CTL; NEE are 
non-energy emissions not already counted in the previous two. 
The emissions from commercial, residential and agricultural energy use are  are too small to see on  this 
scale.  
 
The Growth without Constraints Scenario presents an economy and society based very much on 
the patterns and dynamics that dominate South Africa today. Mining has declined and the 
composition of GDP moved even further into tertiary sectors. The scenario assumes that all 
resource constraints (e.g. local water availability) have been overcome. It further assumes that 
industrial policy continues with its current, energy-intensive focus. No negative feedbacks of a 
changing climate are considered in this Scenario. In the absence of these constraints, the economy 
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by 2050 is still performing well, and by all accounts South Africa is seen as a successful country 
having achieved its goals. Its emissions, however, have quadrupled.  
 
Comparing the Scenarios’ emission trajectories,  
 and introducing current efforts 
 
The  Growth without Constraints Scenario has shown emissions quadrupling. What  would happen 
if existing Government policy was implemented?.  This is shown in another trajectory, called 
Current Development Plans, which includes the Government’s Energy Efficiency Strategy to 
achieve a final energy demand reduction of 12% by 2015.14 Also included is the current target of 
10 000 GWh renewable energy contribution to final energy consumption by 2013.  
 
 The trajectory (shown in the next graph) shows that Current Development Plans do reduce 
emissions below Growth without Constraints  initially. But when extended to 2050, however, the 
trajectory is not radically different from the Growth without Constraints Scenario - it still 
continues climbing. Emissions reach a level above 1500 Mt per year in 2050.  
 
What can be learnt from this?  Whilst an appreciable level of effort is apparent, it means that 
current Government policies do not lower the emission trajectory significantly below the Growth 
without Constraints Scenario.   
 
                                            
14 This is in line with the Energy Efficiency Strategy of the Republic of South Africa (DME 2005), which sets a higher 
target of 15% for some major sectors, notably industry, mining and commerce. The renewable target is taken from the 
White Paper on Renewable Energy (DME 2003). 
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SCENARIO 2 
What if full-scale Mitigation was undertaken by South Africa?  
The “Required by Science” story 
 
If South Africa had all the resources and technology at its disposal to contribute to the global 
mitigation effort that is required to stabilise the climate, what could it achieve by 2050? What 
would the implications be if South 
Africa began to chart this course 
from 2007 onwards?  
 
In this scenario, called the 
Required by Science Scenario, 
South Africa joins the world 
community in taking action to 
stabilise GHG concentrations, and 
negotiates a target as its fair 
contribution to this shared vision.  
 
The IPCC15 tells us that to stabilise 
GHG concentrat-ions, global 
reductions of between -60% to -
80% from 1990 levels must be 
achieved by 2100.16 The burden of 
sharing this target between nations is the subject of the international negotiations.  
 
In  the Required by Scenario, the burden taken up by South Africa is not exact, but is seen rather 
as a target band of between -30% to -40% from 2003 levels by 2050. A burden-sharing discount 
has been assumed i.e. that SA bears less than its proportional share of the global burden of 
reduction because it is a developing country.  
 
The lower end of the target (-40%) can be thought of as a global or collective bottom line. The 
upper end of the target range suggests some differentiation in responsibility, depending on 
countries’ different capabilities and different national circumstances. The target range can be made 
even wider, although this is not explored in the Required by Science Scenario.  
 
By 2050 the Growth without Constraints Scenario and the Required by Science Scenario look 
dramatically different from each other, both in their picture of everyday life and in their respective 
emission trajectories.  
 
                                            
15 The Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change, the leading scientific body on climate change. 
16 At the time that the Scenario Building Team agreed this level for 2050, the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment had not yet 
been published. The latest science suggests that, if anything, even greater reductions will be needed for the required 
stabilisation levels to avoid serious impacts.  
A note on modelling this scenario 
The Required by Science scenario could not be modelled 
in the same way as the Growth without Constraints 
reference Scenario. The reason is primarily because this 
scenario depends on technologies and measures whose 
parameters are largely unknown, and therefore it cannot 
be assessed within a modelling framework based on 
known technologies with well-understood parameters, 
including cost. The LTMS process did not attempt to 
quantify the emission reductions or costs of behavioural 
changes, and so could not analyse the costs and other 
characteristics of this scenario. This scenario is therefore 
the classic “story of the future” with its components 



































































As can be seen, there is a large gap between the emissions trajectories of the Growth without 
Constraints Scenario and the Required by Science Scenario. Growth without Constraints 
emissions grow exponentially, while Required by Science peaks quite early, in 2020, at around 
470 Mt CO2-eq, and then declines. The gap in 2050 represents some 1300 Mt per year of 
mitigation effort – the gap itself is three times larger than South Africa’s total emissions in 2003.  
 
The results show that even if a large burden-sharing discount is negotiated, the extent of the 
emissions reduction challenge does not shift significantly. The degree of the burden-sharing 
discount will be based on a number of factors:  
 South Africa’s status as a developing country and our imperative to reduce poverty.  
 The coal-based nature of South Africa’s energy economy and the degree of effort and cost 
to make the changes required. 
 The extent to which the technological and financial resource transfers agreed in the 
Convention are realised.  
 
It is assumed in this Scenario that South Africa does not have to take the same mitigation actions 
as the developed countries but, along with other major emitters in the developing world, it takes 
responsibility and quantifiable mitigation action commensurate with its level of development and 
national circumstances.   
 
For South Africa, emissions would still rise at first, but they would have to peak at an appropriate 
level, and sufficiently early, to guarantee the required decline to the target range of this scenario. 
This implies large emissions reductions achieved through a coordinated mitigation programme at 
the national level with appropriate international assistance. In short, a high degree of planning is 
required in this scenario.  
 
In turn the Required by Science Scenario assumes that climate security is guaranteed through joint 
international action. Developed countries reduce emissions by -80% from 1990 levels by 2050, 
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enabling South Africa to limit its emissions to -30% to -40% of 2003 levels. South Africa suffers 
less dramatic climate change impacts, and experiences reduced costs for adaptation and lower 
direct damage costs. 
 
The Required by Science Scenario sees a South Africa in 2050 vastly different to the one we know 
today. New technologies dominate the electricity generation and transport sectors,  and the 
renewable and nuclear technologies  encountered in the Growth without Constraints Scenario are 
taken up much earlier, and at a much larger scale. It is assumed that large-scale investment in new 
technologies across the globe will have substantially reduced the unit costs of technologies, for 
example renewables. New technologies, notably hydrogen-based transport, will by then be the 
norm, with hydrogen being manufactured through non-carbon means. Although the largest 
emissions reductions are achieved in the energy and fuel sectors, a good proportion of emissions 
reduction come about through widespread changes in human behaviour patterns that underpin 
GHG emission. Much of this is achieved through awareness, as most citizens will be acutely 
concerned about emissions and adopting low emission lifestyles.  
 
In the sections that follow, more detail is provided on the likely characteristics of this scenario. To 
a large degree the Required by Science Scenario imagines a post-carbon world very different from 
ours, one that is therefore difficult to describe in detail. What we do know, however, is that 
achieving this emissions target range will be an immense task.  
  
Assessing the scenarios for plausibility and robustness 
 
How do the Growth without Constraints Scenario and the Required by Science Scenario relate to a 
future “real world in 2050”?  Which scenario is more robust, and more plausible, in this future real 
world?  
 
The  table below shows  under which conditions the two Scenarios can survive and be robust.  The 
conditions for each scenario to flourish are given, and correspondingly  the conditions for it to fail 




Growth without Constraints Scenario is really only likely if the world fails in its efforts around 
climate change, if oil remains cheap, and if South Africa can survive isolated from a carbon 
conscious world. The Required by Science Scenario flourishes on a broader spectrum, but does 
best where the world reaches agreement and where climate-friendly technologies come into the 
market and flow freely. It is only viable with international technology and financial support. 
Growth without Constraints Scenario is 
only robust if: 
Required by Science Scenario is only 
robust if: 
 International climate consensus 
collapse/fragment 
 Technologies not developed or don’t flow 
freely 
 Oil cheap and abundant, no carbon 
premium on coal 
 Fragmented trade systems, bilaterals and 
free for all 
 
 International climate consensus reached 
and effective 
 International flows of appropriate 
technology/finance  
 Peak oil arrives, oil scarce and expensive, 
coal premiums 





Both scenarios can only survive in the long run if climate impacts are kept to manageable limits. 
But as the Growth without Constraints Scenario is in fact a contributor to catastrophic impacts, it 
becomes implausible. The Scenario Building Team concluded unanimously that Growth without 
Constraints is neither robust nor plausible in a world that has come to grips with climate change. 
 
This leaves Required by Science as the more robust and compelling scenario, and leads to the 
question: What has to be done to reach its goals, which are to reduce annual emissions by 1300 Mt 
CO2-eq per year by 2050? What mitigation actions should South Africa take to reach this 
objective? What options are available? And what would the effect on our economy be of such 
actions?  
 
LTMS proceeded by exploring groups of mitigation action options (‘wedges’) and considering 
their emissions reduction results and impacts on the economy. These were then assembled as 
packages of actions to inform strategic planning. Four such Strategic Options were packaged, and 
these are presented below.  
 
Given that most emissions are attributable to the energy 
sector, most of the work was focussed on achieving 
reductions in this sector. However mitigation can be 
achieved across many sectors, not only through 
technology, but also through behaviour change. The first 
three LTMS Strategic Options explore wedges of 
emissions reductions in a wide range of sectors. They 
model currently known technology that can be costed. The 
relative size of the emissions reductions that are achieved 
illustrate where the biggest and most affordable mitigation 
actions can be carried out. These largest wedges are 
illustrated in the first three Strategic Options. Future 
technologies and human behaviour changes cannot be 
modelled by LTMS, but these elements are included in the 
fourth and final Strategic Option.  
 
 
The methodology of arriving at 
Strategic Options  
 
• The Scenario Building Team 
first considered individual 
mitigation actions, as wedges 
of emission reductions. 
• The wedges were modelled, 
reported, refined and extended 
forward in time.  
• Combining various wedges 
produced packages of action 
large enough to reveal distinct 
pathways.  
• These modelled pathways 




Strategic Options for reaching the “Required by Science” objective 
 
Four Strategic Options are now presented, which, when implemented together, would allow South 
Africa to achieve the Required by Science Scenario. The four Strategic Options are not presented 
in order of implementation or importance, and all of them would need immediate and significant 
effort.  
 
Each of the first three packages considers costs, emissions results, and economy-wide impacts. 
They emerged through a process of progressively modelling actions which would largely take 
place through state action. The first set of actions modelled, called the Start Now strategy, added 
no net cost to the economy against the Growth without Constraints base case. This suggested a 
clear imperative for pursuing this strategy.  
 
However it was found that the Start Now strategy closed less than half of the gap between the 
Growth without Constraints and the Required by Science scenarios (44% in 2050). This prompted 
an extension, within the bounds of reasonableness and feasibility, of the Start Now actions. The 
results of this much more ambitious package closed two-thirds (64%) of the gap between the two 
scenarios.  
 
The actions suggested by the four strategies can be summarised as follows: 
  
Start Now Suggests actions that save money over time. 
Scale Up Suggests further extension of the actions in Start Now, but adding more 
wedges with positive cost. 
Use the Market Additional to or replacing the first two options, suggests tax and incentive 
packages.  
Reach for the 
Goal 





Strategic Option 1: “Start Now” 
 
This strategic option suggests mitigation actions that are implemented 
through state action. The actions suggested should be taken for good 
economic reasons and other sustainable development co-benefits, quite 
independent of climate change. This option saves money over time, even if 
implemented up to 2050 (the orange line in the graph at left).  
 
All net-negative cost wedges are good candidates for Start Now.  Net-
negative cost wedges are mitigation actions that have upfront costs, but where the savings over 
time more than outweigh the initial costs. Energy efficiency is the classic example. 
 
In each case, the relevant sector would have to act to realise the wedges of emissions reduction. 
Each government department would have to consider policy and other actions needed to drive the 
emissions reduction action described in that wedge. Different sectors with their corresponding 
government departments would have to be involved in implementing sectoral plans.  
 
The Start Now option goes beyond implementing or extrapolating existing policy. The analysis 
shows that quite substantial positive cost wedges can be included in the strategy, as these are 
offset by large negative cost wedges.  The largest net-negative wedges are to be found in industrial 
energy efficiency. In the transport sector, for example, the Start Now option assumes that greater 
efficiency of vehicles is promoted and vehicle size is limited. Technological change allows a shift 
to hybrid vehicles, while at the same time behavioural changes are reflected in passengers shifting 
from private to public modes of transport.  
 
Energy supply sees a move away from coal-fired electricity, with renewables, nuclear and cleaner 
coal each providing 27% of electricity generated by 2050.  
 
The biggest wedges for Start Now – in terms of emission reductions – are those shown in the 
diagrams on the left. The vertical axis of each wedge shows the emission reduction for any year 
from 2003 to 2050, while the area of each wedge represents the cumulative emission reductions 
over this period. The Rand figures on each diagram indicate the cost-effectiveness in R / t CO2-eq.  
For Start Now, the biggest wedges are in efficiency in industry and transport (greater vehicle 
efficiency and shifts from private to public transport) as well as in more renewable sources and 
nuclear sources for electricity. More detail is given in the Technical Summary. Further wedges are 
illustrated in the Annexure to this document.
17  
 
Emissions in Start Now are lower than in the Growth without Constraints Scenario –  there is a 
relative reduction in emissions, with an average of about 230 Mt CO2-eq  avoided each year.  
However absolute emissions continue to rise, reaching around 1000 Mt by 2050, well over 
double the level of the base year (2003). Another way of thinking about this is to consider how 
much of the gap between the two scenarios is closed. Start Now reduces the gap by 43% in 2050.  
 
                                            
17 The wedges in the Annexure are a fuller set than the major wedges shown in each Strategy Option. Variations on 



























The overall cost of mitigation of the ‘initial wedges’ is a saving equivalent to 0.5% of the size of 
the economy, thus giving a net economic gain.
18
 In the energy system, costs are reduced by 2.2% 
compared to Growth without Constraints.  
 
The economy-wide impacts of Start Now can now be assessed. The impacts 
on GDP, on job creation and poverty reduction are revealed through economy-
wide modelling. The modelling shows that Start Now has a relatively small 
impact on the economy, at least in the shorter period considered robust for 
economy-wide results (0.1% in 2015), and this is buoyed somewhat by the 
positive effects of increased energy efficiency. While the impact on jobs is 
negative, this again is small (-0.3%). Nevertheless even small job losses are of 
concern, and would need offsetting measures. The lowest figure is -2% for 
semi-skilled workers in 2010.  
 
At the same time, household welfare rises 3% on average. The effects are not 
the same for all household types, since the greatest effect is to draw on 
household savings to finance new investment, which mostly comes from more 
affluent households. Start Now requires less saving, so high-income 
households benefit the most. One could call this an unintended consequence.  
 
To enable Start Now, existing policy must be implemented, and aggressively. 
But under the Start Now strategy, South Africa would have to go further than 
existing policy, notably in diversifying its energy mix for both electricity and 
liquid fuels.  
 
In short, Start Now is the obvious and economically imperative strategy 
option, even though it is institutionally challenging.  But it is not sufficient to 
reach the Required by Science objectives by 2050, nor is it likely to be 
regarded as an adequate or fair contribution in the multinational negotiations. It runs the risk of 
creating an uncompetitive economy (as other economies and trade relations advance to climate-
friendly technologies and trade rules), and leaving stranded assets in the economy. This is why it 
is called Start Now: the modelling shows it is a good start, with positive economy-wide results in 
the short term, and is good at least for the next decade. It would certainly be an appropriate 
strategy during a second commitment period under a Kyoto succession agreement. It would allow 
South Africa to demonstrate its commitment to making its development more sustainable – 
reducing emissions whilst not reducing GDP (some job losses are illustrated).  
 
Start Now is thus a good Strategic Option for the first part of an overall mitigation plan.  
 
                                            
18 Mitigation costs are reported in various units. Unit mitigation costs (Rand per ton of CO2-eq) reflect the difference 
in costs between the mitigation and reference case, averaged over the period and using a discount rate of 10%.  The 
Technical Report shows results for discounting at 3% –  the rate recommended by the IPCC for long-term mitigation 
analysis – and 15%, which is closer to a rate of return.  To give a sense of the total mitigation cost, we compare the 
total increase (or decrease) in system costs to the size of the economy. In this context, the % GDP should not be 
understood as an impact on GDP, but is simply a way of comparing aggregate mitigation costs to the size of the 
economy.  
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Strategic Option 2: “Scale up”  
 
The LTMS results for the Start Now Strategic Option showed that less 
than half the gap was closed in reaching for the Required by Science 
target. Thus an extension of the Start Now package of actions needed to be 
considered. The Scenario Building Team modelled two means of going 
further towards Required by Science – the first through state-led action (in 
Strategic Option 2: Scale Up) and the second through economic 
instruments (in Strategic Option 3: Use the Market).  
 
The results suggest that South Africa should prepare for a scaling up of the 
actions taken in the early years of Start Now. Because such a scaling up would take the cost of 
acting into net-positive cost territory, a careful analysis of the impacts of this cost on the economy 
is required. In Scale Up, South Africa achieves this higher level of ambition through regulatory 
decision. The effect of this on the emissions trajectory can be seen in the green line on the graph – 
the trajectory gets about halfway to the objective if taken through to 2050.  
 
The two strategies taken together can be thought of as “Energy Efficiency Plus”. Start Now built 
some positive cost wedges on top of the negative cost ones. Scale Up goes further, adding further 
positive cost actions without significantly extending the negative cost ones. Unlike Start Now, 
which saved money while mitigating, Scale Up results in a cost of R39 per ton CO2. However this 
cost is potentially affordable, being at the lower end of the range of prices already seen in the 
carbon markets. 
 
The Scale Up strategy sees a transition to zero-carbon electricity by mid-century, with nuclear 
power and renewable energy wedges each being extended to 50% of electricity generated by 2050. 
Cleaner coal technologies, particularly IGCC, already enter the Growth without Constraints 
reference case, so the emission reductions of that wedge are modest. In the Scale Up strategy, 
however, the technology of carbon capture and storage matures, and is scaled up by a factor of 10 
bigger than the largest currently planned facilities. Biofuels are extended as far as limits of arable 
land, water, and concerns about biodiversity and food security allow. As the country moves 
towards a zero-emissions electricity grid, electric vehicles provide a new transport technology that 
reduces emissions.  
 
Scale Up leads to total emission reductions of around 13 800 Mt CO2-eq between 2003 and 2050. 
Emissions follow the Start Now profile fairly closely at first, and continue to rise; but in the last 
decade they level out (plateau). Scale Up still does not, however, result in an overall decline in 
emissions – the 2003 emissions level almost doubles by 2050. Thus it too is only a partial 
solution. Under Scale Up, the gap is closed by two-thirds (64%) in 2050. Emission reductions 
become significantly larger than in Start Now around 2030, and in 2050 Scale Up reduces some 
290 Mt CO2-eq per year more.  
  
The overall mitigation costs are equivalent to 0.8% of GDP19  well below the benchmark 
suggested by the Stern Review on the economics of climate change. The Stern Review suggested 
that 1% might be acceptable, and that the costs of inaction would likely be much higher, at 5% to 
20% of GDP. These are global figures, and developing countries may deem 1% of GDP too high 
an opportunity cost. 
                                            
19 Note that “% of GDP” in this analysis does not refer to the impact on the economy, but simply compares aggregate 
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Scale Up shows a positive impact on GDP initially, with a 1% increase in 2015. Employment 
broadly follows the GDP increase, with a 1% improvement in 2015. Low- and semi-skilled jobs 
increase, the latter peaking at 3% in 2015. However, there is a negative impact on household 
welfare: on average -1%, but slightly positive for low-income households (0.3%) and most 
negative for high-income households (-5.2%). Since greater investment is required in Scale Up, 
this again has to come from high-income households. The negative welfare effects under this 
scenario are generally small for other household groups, at least until 2015. 
 
The big wedges in Scale Up again include industrial efficiency. Nuclear 
power and renewables for electricity give bigger emission reductions, but now 
at a higher cost per ton of CO2 avoided. Renewable energy technologies show 
greater labour-intensity than other alternatives for generating electricity, and 
hence positive impacts on jobs (see the Technical Summary and Report).
20
 
New wedges are electric vehicles (which save emissions even if they operate 
in the same grid) and CO2 capture and storage (CCS) for synfuels.  
 
As regards national policy, Scale Up requires an ambitious plan for energy. 
Moving the energy economy, which currently relies on coal for three-quarters 
of primary energy, to zero-carbon electricity, is a massive undertaking. Under 
the Scale Up option, energy efficiency cannot be left to voluntary 
agreements, but must be guided by a policy framework and systems of 
penalties / incentives. 
 
For the international negotiations, Scale Up is an ‘ambitious-transitional’ 
strategy. It is ambitious because it extends efforts well beyond existing 
plans. Yet it is transitional because the plateau arrives at a stage so late 
(2040-2050) as to be implausible in the negotiating context. This is why it 
could be examined in conjunction with other options, including the use of 
market-based instruments.  
                                            
20 Information on labour intensity or ‘jobs per megawatt installed capacity’ is obtained from a report by AGAMA 
(2003), which draws on Eskom for employment figures in various plants in 2003 and other energy statistics. For 
further details, see the Appendix to the Technical Report (section 13.2.2.2, p50), as well as the technical input paper 
on economy-wide modelling, p. 7.  
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Strategic option 3: “Use the Market”  
 
The aim in this option is to get the market to work and 
promote the uptake of the accelerated technologies and 
social behaviour through incentives and taxes. At the tax 
levels considered in this option, Use the Market results in 
emissions reductions beyond those seen in Scale Up by using 
economic instruments – both taxes and incentives – to shift 
patterns of domestic investment. The key driver of Use the 
Market is a CO2 tax – a price change which makes the use of fossil fuels much less 
attractive, and induces an indirect effect of greater investment in low-carbon 
technologies.  
  
The Scenario Building Team considered various levels of CO2 tax. The one included 
in Use the Market assumes that, over time, the price will rise from levels currently 
seen in carbon markets of R100 / t CO2-eq. The rising tax level is designed to 
approximate a phase of slowing emissions growth, stabilising emissions and 
ultimately reducing absolute emissions through a high carbon tax of R750 in the last 
decade.21  
 
Taxes generate revenues, and these can be used to provide incentives. For example, 
in Use the Market, much greater use of solar water heaters is incentivised. Instead of 
setting a target for renewables (as in the other two options), the cost gap is closed by 
38c / kWh for renewable electricity.  
 
The tax drives electricity supply to move away from coal to nuclear and renewables. No new coal 
plants are built and existing coal power supply declines rapidly from 2025, so that by 2040 only 4 
GW of coal capacity is left. A total of 14 new conventional nuclear plants are built, adding 25 GW 
of new capacity by 2050. The renewables plants come in smaller units, but add a total of 118 GW 
by 2050 – 61 GW of solar trough, 42 GW of solar tower and 15 GW of wind. The price subsidy 
tilts the balance of alternatives towards renewables. By 2050 the total grid capacity is 151 GW, 
compared to 120 GW in the Growth without Constraints reference case.  
 
Under the Use the Market Strategic Option, with a CO2 tax, no new CTL (coal-to-liquid) plant is 
built, but only new oil refineries – five of them. CTL plants would only be built if a significantly 
higher
22
 oil price is assumed, and also if it is assumed that CCS was implemented at large scale or 
CTL became more carbon efficient by combining with other mitigation options such as biomass, 
other renewables, or nuclear. 
 
                                            
21 The tax level starts at R100 / t CO2-eq in 2008 (current CDM prices) but rises to R250 in 2020 (prices already seen 
in the EU trading scheme); then flattens out as emissions growth in developing countries stabilises (2030 to 2040), 
before rising again to higher prices needed for absolute emission reductions in the long run (R750 from 2040 to 2050). 
22 The first sensitivity analysis on the oil price sees it rising from $55 / bbl in 2003 to $100 / bbl in 2030 and 
extrapolated at the same rate beyond. The second sensitivity rises to $155 / bbl in 2030. In the base case, the oil price 
is flat at the 2003 year level.. 
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Use the Market reduces emissions by 17 500 Mt CO2-eq between 2003 and 2050. Emissions in 
2050 are 620 Mt CO2-eq, closing the gap between Growth without Constraints and  Required by 
Science by over three-quarters (76%).  
  
The major wedges in Use the Market are an escalating CO2 tax, and incentives for renewables for 
electricity generation, biofuels and solar water heaters. Note that in the diagrams of wedges, the 
scale for the CO2  tax is twice as big as for any other wedges shown – in 2050, it reduces 
emissions by more than 600 Mt CO2-eq.  
 
Use the Market includes taxes and incentives. Economic models see taxes as a distortion away 
from equilibrium. Hence the impact on GDP is negative (-2% in 2015). This finding is important, 
but taxes also generate revenues.  
 
In Use the Market, jobs increase for lower-skilled workers (+3% semi-
skilled, 0% for unskilled in 2015), but decrease for higher-skilled 
workers (-2% for skilled and -4% for highly skilled).  This is due to the 
changes that are induced fairly rapidly by the tax. Welfare effects in 
Use the Market are negative overall, except for poorer households for 
whom it is neutral (0%). 
 
Understanding the importance of revenue recycling is critical to a full 
understanding the economic impacts of Use the Market. At least at 
lower tax levels, spending revenue elsewhere could offset some of the 
negative impact on economic output. Given that the carbon tax is the 
biggest single wedge modelled, approaches that yield a triple dividend 
(growing the economy, creating jobs and improving income 
distribution) need further work.  
 
While the carbon tax shows expected results on the supply side, the 
response on the demand side in the model is smaller than one would 
expect in reality. In particular, emissions from the industry and transport 
sector continue to rise throughout the period. Industry continues to use 
coal directly and only makes a limited switch to gas, and then only late, 
in the last decade. The use of petrol, diesel and jet fuel continues 
unabated in the transport sector, with the other options still too limited. 
For example, passenger cars can become electric, but electric trucks are 
not yet modelled.  
 

























The Challenge of reaching “Required by Science” 
Going beyond Strategic Options 1, 2 and 3  
 
 The Strategic Options considered so far are motivated by a long-term 
goal of reaching what is Required by Science. Yet it is clear that 
partial solutions to the climate challenge are pointless. They will 
involve great cost and will not solve any of the looming problems: 
failure to maintain competitive advantage, climate/political/trade risk, 
impacts and stranded assets. At the same time, even with an 
aggressive Scale Up of actions based on technologies we know and 
are able to cost (either driven by regulation or market), realistically 
the three Strategic Options suggested so far only get South Africa 
two-thirds of the way to the Required by Science goal. A parallel investigation of the “triangle of 
emissions” remaining from the middle to the end of the period may also provide new cost-
effective solutions for the near term.  
 
In addition, from about 2030 the levels of uncertainty are such that model results become less 
helpful. Beyond this point lie many questions for which answers are not apparent today. 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on discount rates (reporting on three rates for each wedge in 
the Technical Report), lower economic growth assumptions and fuel prices (oil, gas, coal and 
uranium). The oil price has already increased significantly since the LTMS process started. Higher 
oil prices would make CTL more competitive and would also favour the adoption of alternative 
transport technologies, such as electric vehicles and hybrids. 
 
While we expect that new technologies will emerge, we do not yet know what they will look like. 
Awareness of climate change may induce significant changes in people’s patterns of consumption 
and behaviour – but to what extent? The fourth Strategic Option, Reaching for the Goal, lays the 
platform for getting these answers.  
 
Let us summarise the combined effect of the first three Strategic Options over time. Both Start 
Now and Scale Up as strategies are reasonably close to the goal in the first half of the period, but 
diverge from Required by Science and from each other in the second half. Following these 
strategies until 2050 would foreclose the options of reaching the Required by Science goal. By 
around 2020 (this is not a prescriptive date, and is approximate) South African emissions should 
level out or plateau – and then decline at a later date. The third strategy, Use the Market, reduces 
emissions the most, but after 2035 falls short of the goal.  So although Scale Up closes the gap 
between Required by Science and Growth without Constraints by roughly two-thirds (64%), and 
Use the Market gets us almost three-quarters (72%) of the way there, a ‘triangle’ of emission 
reductions remains unfulfilled. Hence a new set of options would have to be ready for 
implementation by this time. This Strategic Option would be pursued in parallel with the others. 
This is the Reaching for the Goal option.  
?
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Strategic option 4: “Reaching for the goal” 
 
In the Reaching for the Goal option, exact costs cannot be modelled, nor can economy-wide 
impacts. The principal reason for this lies in the unknown technologies and behavioural changes 
that will have to mark this scale of emission reductions. Whilst it is acknowledged that the 
components of this strategic option cannot be modelled with any accuracy as was done with the 
other options, we can imagine what some of its salient characteristics might have to be, by 2050.  
 




1: New Technology: investing in technologies for the future 
 
The first set of actions refers to “new” technologies not yet modelled in LTMS. The Scenario 
Building Team chose a range of technologies not yet in the market, but which are at this stage 
“known”, whether in the laboratory or already deployed in demonstration, and subjected them to 
the following test: 
• Which show the most potential in achieving large emissions reductions? 
• Which carry the lowest perceived technological risk? 
• Which are likely to achieve extensive transfer internationally? 
• Which appear to contribute most to the high emissions areas: electricity generation, 
transport, and industrial efficiency? 
The study included a cursory pass at this problem, and a possible list of these technologies 
emerged. Stakeholders interested in how the Scenario Building Team developed the provisional 
technology list should look to the Process Report. 
 
In Reaching for the Goal, technologies are seen as systems. Stand-alone technologies are 
integrated into larger systems, and taking a system view can increase savings. Technology 
interacts with human behaviour: An example would be a decentralised grid, in which citizens 
can generate their own electricity and pass surpluses back to the grid. Integrating distributed 
generation into the grid requires further research and development (R&D). Such efforts should 
build on the Department of Science and Technology’s climate change R&D strategy.   
 
These technologies require aggressive R&D effort, which should begin at the same time as the 
Start Now Strategy. Bringing these technologies to the market, at scale, backed up by 







2: Resource identification: searching for lower-carbon resources 
 
The second set of actions refers again to technology, but with the stress on resource availability. 
Here two technologies stand out: imported hydro energy from the Congo or East Africa, and 
natural gas from Kalahari and elsewhere. Significant gas found in the region would play a 
significant role in switching from coal. Security problems would have to be solved with 
imported hydro-electricity from our African neighbours. These two resource issues need further 
investigation, including the related political issues.  
 
3: People-oriented measures: Incentivised behaviour change 
 
One of the most compelling results of LTMS is that although most of the significant 
emissions reductions need to be within the energy sector, the technology-based actions, even 
when all carried out together, do not “close the gap”. Hence one must turn to the least studied 
of the possible options – social behaviour.  
 
Changes in social behaviour, whether driven by policy, education, or awareness, may yet 
prove to have large scale and low cost mitigation effects. This may be so across a number of 
sectors.  
 Human habitation, urban planning and the built environment are all areas where social 
change and new patterns, approaches and expectations will likely have significant 
mitigation effects.  
 The distance between work, home and other life functions is also a factor. 
 Modal shifts to public transport,  moves away from individual car ownership towards 
the operation of shared vehicles, and other transport shifts deserve study. Business, 
commerce and consumption is currently heavily linked to transport of people. Much 
of this could potentially be replaced by, for example, internet-based interfaces.  
 Food production and consumption, as well as the localisation of these activities, are 
also examples worthy of study.  
 Population growth, but more importantly the growth of an urbanised population with 
high commodity expectations, could also be studied to see which changes may result 
in emissions reductions and how these might be driven.  
 Tree planting and greening of towns is important.  
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4: Transition to a low-carbon economy: redefining our competitive 
advantage   
 
Another compelling result from LTMS concerns the composition of the South African 
economy. The composition of the economy has played a major role in our high emissions, 
and any change in this and in our competitiveness, is worthy of further assessment. Perhaps 
the most difficult but most fundamental approach to mitigation would be to shift South 
Africa’s economy away from its energy-intensive path. The LTMS results suggest that energy 
efficiency and a cleaner fuel mix are significant mitigation actions, but in the long run, the 
challenge is to consider the energy-intensity of our economy, structurally. 
 
Considering this path would mean that instead of investing in energy-intensive sectors, which 
were at the heart of our economy over the twentieth century, South Africa would move 
towards a low-carbon economy. Industrial policy would then favour those sectors that use less 
energy per unit of economic output. Such a change would have to be integrated into the 
Department of Trade and Industry’s National Industrial Policy Framework and Action Plan.   
 
Over time, most economies shift from primary and secondary sectors to tertiary sectors.  
South Africa’s GDP has already shifted significantly from mining through manufacturing to 
services. Associated with this shift is a decrease in energy intensity. Yet policy still tends to 
define competitive advantage around energy-intensive sectors. Climate change may require 
that we re-define what we mean by competitive advantage. This could have several 
dimensions. 
  
One dimension would be to focus on those parts of the economy which are not so sensitive to 
energy price rises. A transition to a low-carbon economy in South Africa might involve 
shifting incentives – removing incentives for attracting energy-intensive investments and 
using the resources freed up to promote lower-carbon industries.  
 
A low-carbon economy will not emerge overnight. Energy-intensive industries will continue 
to exist, and a comprehensive strategy would have to include transition for these sectors and 
their labour forces. Policies to assist energy-intensive industry would include promoting 
higher value-added sectors, as well as ambitious energy efficiency targets (since the potential 
for energy savings are greater here).  
 
More proactively, the transition would define new areas of advantage in climate-friendly 
technology. In much the same way as Brazil has become a world leader in biofuels, South 
Africa could deliberately seek to build new competitive advantage in climate-friendly 
technologies, such as solar thermal electricity or the pebble bed modular nuclear reactor 




Key findings  
 
A key result of the LTMS process is  how it reveals the large gap between where our emissions 
are heading and where they need to go. Even with various Strategic Options, a gap remains. Start 
Now would achieve around 43% of the goal; Scale Up gets us about two-thirds (64%) of the way 
from Growth without Constraints  to  Required by Science; and Use the Market closes the gap by 
three-quarters (76%). The remaining “triangle” of emissions  challenges the exploration of new 
territory. 
 


































































































































The key findings of the LTMS process, illustrated in the diagram, are:   
 
1. Growing without carbon constraints may be good for South Africa’s economic growth, but 
it will result in rapidly increasing emissions. A four-fold increase in emissions by 2050 is 
likely to be unacceptable to the international community. It is also a high-risk approach on 
other grounds, such as rising oil prices, carbon constraints in trade, and advancing impacts.  
 
2. If all countries, including high emitters in the developing word, adopted a Growth without 
Constraints approach, climate change impacts in South Africa would be extensive.  
 
3. A massive effort would be needed by South Africa to achieve emissions reduction 
sufficient to meet the Required by Science target. The gap between where South Africa’s 
emissions are going and where they need to go is large (1300 Mt CO2-eq, more than three 
times South Africa’s annual emissions of 446 Mt in 2003).   
 
4. Certain quantifiable strategic mitigation options are immediately implementable, even if 
they require significant effort. These include: energy efficiency, especially in industry; 
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electricity supply options; CCS; transport efficiency and shifts; people-oriented strategies; 
supported by awareness (see ‘Next Steps’ and the Annexure for details). These potential 
strategies show good emissions reduction results with costs to the economy ranging from 
affordable to significant. Significant mitigation action can have net public benefits, such as 
savings in energy bills and increased employment.  
 
5. Within the quantifiable mitigation strategies, South Africa can choose both regulatory and 
economic instruments. Neither of these, however, completely closes the gap. With an 
escalating tax, economic instruments go the furthest in closing the gap – by almost three-
quarters. But they are not intrinsically more effective than regulation.  
 
6. Preparing for a range of further, more uncertain and (for now) less understood actions – 
from future technology to changes in social behaviour – needs immediate exploration.   
 
7. Key to success will be strong, committed and engaged South African leadership in 
government, business and civil society, coupled with international alignment and active 
support.  
 
These findings have further implications in terms of cost and multilateral negotiations.  
 
The cost implications of combined mitigation actions shown in the diagram is outlined in the 
Technical Summary (section 7.3).  In essence, this compares the total mitigation costs over a 48-
year period with the size of the economy. (As mentioned, “% of GDP” in this analysis does not 
refer to the impact on the economy, but simply compares aggregate mitigation costs to the size of 
the economy.)  
 
Assuming the Stern threshold of 1% of GDP level were an acceptable overall cost to the South 
African economy, it is important to see where this level is crossed. This is calculated by adding 
different wedges incrementally, starting from the least-cost wedge. This is shown in the diagram 
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As can be seen, combining a set of negative cost options – mostly energy efficiency in various 
sectors – makes the share of GDP more negative, so that the curve initially slopes downward. The 
diagram shows that a range of positive cost wedges, such as those for electricity generation or 
CCS, can be added with the combined costs still remaining below 0% of GDP.   
 
The key findings also have implications for negotiations. LTMS concluded that the trajectory 
illustrated in the graph above for Required by Science is not realisable with currently known 
technologies. The question is how to get South Africa’s emissions, after a period of unavoidable 
increase, to plateau and then to drop. Here two areas of “flexibility” appear. The first is: what is 
the “negotiating region” for the final goal set in the Required by Science trajectory? This 
could be anything between say -10% of current emissions and the full, undiscounted goal of -50%. 
The latter is not only what the latest science says is required, but is also currently under discussion 
in political circles, e.g. the G8+5 process. This “discount” means that other richer developed 
nations will have to reduce emissions more, hence allowing South Africa to do less.  
 
The second area of flexibility is: when and how high do South Africa’s emissions peak? It is clear 
that if the peak is too high, the decline is harder to achieve – likewise if the peak comes too late. 
 28 
Arresting the emissions trajectory at the correct point at some time around the middle of the period 
becomes the subject of further planning. By implementing the Start Now and Scale Up or Use 
the Market options, South Africa will create the time to develop the strategies that will achieve 
the peak and decline of emissions.  
 
The full implications for negotiators on the international front need to be further explored by the 
delegation. The LTMS process has analysed a range of quantifiable mitigation objectives, which 
provide information for South Africa to negotiate.  
 
For domestic policy makers, business leaders and leaders in South African society, LTMS has 
revealed that action will be required across the board, and extensive further work is required. 





Scenarios can help inform long-term policy choices and negotiating positions – particularly when 
underpinned by the rigorous analysis presented in the LTMS Technical Report. Regardless of the 
pathway chosen by South Africa, some “across-the-board realities” emerge, suggesting a list of 
next steps.  
 
The LTMS process has presented two starkly different scenarios. The first step will be for a high 
level group of leaders to add their inputs to the LTMS study. The scenarios and strategic options, 
possibly in revised form, will then be presented to the South African Cabinet.   
 
It is suggested that the next step will be to make a move towards a development path consistent 
with one of the two scenarios presented. If the Required by Science Scenario is to be followed, as 
suggested in this study, a number of steps must follow.    
 
1. Energy Efficiency is a component of all the strategic options in the Required by Science 
scenario. Energy Efficiency can deliver large and smart mitigation. Indeed, all the 
suggested strategies can be thought of as “Energy Efficiency plus”. Although economically 
obvious, voluntary agreements only work to a degree. Hence tough motivators will have to 
be introduced, some of which have already been suggested in the Energy Efficiency 
Strategy (DME 2005). Detailed design of such motivators requires urgent work and rapid 
implementation. 
 
2. In electricity generation, the technology choice is fairly clear: there are two key domestic 
alternatives to coal. (Energy imports are another option but these come with key 
uncertainties – e.g. political stability for hydro-electricity from the DRC, and questions as 
to whether the Kalahari gas reserves are real.)  
 
• The challenges for nuclear power outlined in draft policy23 include radioactive 
waste disposal, maintaining non-proliferation, and economic viability. If these can 
be resolved, the expansion of nuclear power is an obvious choice. The nuclear 
building programme will be financed, like other capital investment projects, 
through raising debt. For the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR), government has 
committed to finance 51% of the capital requirements over the next three years.  
                                            
23 DME published a nuclear energy policy and strategy for public comment, July 2007. 
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• An equivalent scale of investment is needed in various renewable energy 
technologies. The challenge here is to scale up in the next years, so that 
implementation at larger scale is feasible and more affordable in future. The central 
problem is cost – and much depends on what technology learning happens in other 
countries (see the Technical Report). Renewable energy technologies face 
challenges due to intermittency of the source and dispatchability, which at larger 
shares may require additional investment in the system, e.g. storage. The Solar 
Power Tower shows most promise and may even have base-load potential.  
• Cleaner coal appears to reduce emissions by relatively small amounts, unless 
accompanied by Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).  
 
3. Transport is the fastest growing emitting sector. It poses the most complex challenges, 
because it encompasses fuels, vehicle technology, infrastructure, as well as behavioural 
changes. Biofuels cannot solve the problem at any scale. An overall package needs to be 
designed, addressing a range of interventions in the sector. This package would have to 
look at the two large mitigation wedges as principal motivators: modal shifts in the way 
human and freight movement is achieved, and technology transfer away from petrol and 
diesel. Electric vehicles and hybrids provide efficiency gains over conventional engines, 
and hydrogen cars emit no GHGs at the point of use. The extent of mitigation will depend 
on the energy source from which the electricity, biofuel or hydrogen that power them is 
derived. Central and decentralised options need to be covered.  
 
4. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is important and requires some attention and support. It 
is clear that CCS is a large part of the solution for both CTL and coal-based electricity, and 
hence is included as a major component of our energy security strategy. CCS needs to 
address challenges and uncertainties, including technical, geological, economic, 
environmental impacts and the regulatory framework – but above all, it needs to prove 
whether it can scale up by a factor of 10 or 100.   
 
5. These are the big mitigation interventions. But there are also many smaller activities that 
deliver cost-effective mitigation, such a manure management in agriculture (see the 
Annexure for an overview). Others are important to their sectors for their own reasons, e.g. 
fire control. A balanced portfolio should include wedges that have socio-
economic/sustainable development benefits, notably in the residential sector. A number of 
government departments will have to address those activities which show most promise in 
their sectors. 
 
6. Several strategic options require immediate support and further research:   
• Social behaviour change 
• Emerging technologies 
• Resource identification 
• Inducing a transition to a low-carbon economy 
Achieving changes in social policy and behavioural change would require 
focused public awareness raising.  
 
7. The damage costs of climate change impacts under different concentration scenarios 
requires further research as the state of knowledge matures. 
 
 30 
None of the technologies, policies and measures highlighted above is a ‘silver bullet’. Investment 
will be needed in a portfolio of mitigation actions. These strategic choices about investment and 
technology will need to be guided by a long-term policy framework. Cost-effective solutions can 
best be found when policy guidance is ‘loud, long and legal’ and comprises a smart mixture of 
regulatory and economic instruments.  
 
A further logical step would be to finalise, on the basis of the parameters presented in the LTMS, a 
long-term climate policy for the country. This would require a more formal policy process, on the 
basis of which government would choose a strategy. This strategy may be a combination or 
variant of the wedges presented here. The strategy could form the basis for a legislative and policy 
package which will give effect to such policy at a mandatory level. This domestic process of 
policy making will closely interact with the international negotiations over the next two years. 
Between 2007 and 2009 a strengthened climate regime for the period after 2012 will be negotiated 
under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The climate challenge can be easily presented in desperately pessimistic terms, or its existence can 
simply be denied. The Scenario Building Team has done neither. It was determined to accept fully 
the current science as a basis to proactively engage in climate action. The scenarios and strategies 
presented here are positive and ambitious but realistic pathways which can meet the expected 
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